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A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (2012). Behav. Brain Sci.
(in press).
The present commentary on Clark (in
press) will emphasize and discuss the role
that high processing related to action plan-
ning may have in Bayesian predictive pro-
cessing and will suggest possible directions
for managing the issue.
Clark agrees to define planning as fol-
lows: “we imagine a future goal state as
actual, then use Bayesian inference to find
the set of intermediate states (which can
now themselves be whole actions) that get
us there” (§1.5). Although this definition
was reported to corroborate the unified
vision of sensor processing, motor con-
trol, and planning suggested by Toussaint
(2009), it does not correspond to the cur-
rent representation of the planning process
in two aspects.
The first aspect entails the hierarchi-
cal vision of a plan as a succession of
intermediate states. Research on planning
(Basso et al., 2001; Phillips et al., 2001) has
shown that the future goal state created
in the beginning is accurate only in some
particular circumstances (i.e., when both
the task and algorithm are well-defined).
In most cases, people are used to fac-
ing underspecified tasks in which a future
goal state cannot be employed to derive
the intermediate states (see Goel and
Grafman, 2000). The first plan created is a
general sketch of the intentions, a blurred
image of the desired goal created by a feed-
forward prediction, which is successively
refined through a continuous interaction
between action and perception (Basso and
Olivetti Belardinelli, 2006; Cisek, 2007).
When the hierarchical predictive process-
ing (HPP) presented by Clark is applied
to the planning of motor sequences, it
is undoubtedly convincing, as it explains
the sensorimotor loop in an efficient way.
However, the same mechanism may be
too limited when applied to the plan-
ning of complex actions sequences. For
example, in a planning task such as
the Traveling Salesperson Problem (TSP:
MacGregor and Ormerod, 1996), partici-
pants changed the initially planned strat-
egy during task execution (Basso et al.,
2006). Moreover, Cazzato et al. (2010)
have demonstrated that a proficient per-
formance is related to cognitive flexibility
(shown while reconsidering the strategy
chosen in the beginning) and not to the
amount of information retrieved by ocular
movements. That is, the overall organized
behavior must be considered as more
important than the summation of single
actions.
The second aspect entails the tim-
ing in which the plan and (sequence
of) action(s) may occur. In a stimulus-
response paradigm a plan is created
and promptly used because the action
must be implemented as soon as possi-
ble. However, in many real-world situ-
ations, events develop in time and the
planned actions must be postponed in
order to be executed at the appropri-
ate moment. Gärling (1994) has provided
an example of everyday planning using a
fictitious environment in which partici-
pants must organize a trip through several
errands like stores with different open-
ing hours. This delay between the plan
and its implementation is also shared with
other cognitive processes such as prospec-
tive memory (PM: Kliegel et al., 2008).
PM requires that a planned action
should be executed only whenever the cir-
cumstances fulfill the conditions, which
were commonly not present when the plan
was created. In a standard scenario, a plan
should be kept in mind while a person
is involved in other ongoing activities,
until the activating conditions are satis-
fied. At that moment, the person should
inhibit the ongoing activity, switch to the
prospective activity, and execute the plan.
During the ongoing activity, some lure
stimuli (distracters, see for PM: Bisiacchi
et al., 2011) could share certain common-
alities with the activating cues, but not
enough to satisfy all the conditions. In
these cases, according to HPP, the prospec-
tive action would increase its activation
value and the probability of being exe-
cuted as well, whereas it should be inhib-
ited instead. HPP models are also required
to account for the inhibition generated
by long-lasting intentions. In the present
state of the art, HPP-based models are
outstanding in producing a response to
a stimulus, but this response is locked in
time to the stimulus itself (i.e., it is simul-
taneous to or must follow the stimulus
as closely as possible). Providing explana-
tions also for the realization of plans with
delayed actions would be a good bench-
mark for determining the effective legiti-
macy of Clark’s approach.
One attempt of this kind has been pro-
posed by Shadlen et al. (2008) in decision-
making. According to their accumulator
model, decisions are taken when the accu-
mulated evidence promoting a specific
choice exceeds a certain threshold value
(determined by prior information and
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costs). Abstract decisions (i.e., those pro-
ducing a plan) are essentially aimed at
creating rules instead of actions. It is
important to highlight that, with respect
to Clark’s model, Shadlen’s includes some
components of the Bayesian inference, but
it avoids using its major assumption, the
posterior probability. Higher processing
falls beyond the aim of Clark’s target arti-
cle, but it is central in its relevance for a
model aiming at describing human pro-
cessing. It is not that motor planning is
more or less important than other higher-
level planning, but they both show the
same level of importance and need to be
explained.
A unified mechanism for managing
input–output processes is undoubt-
edly efficient and successful in species
evolution. Therefore, it is likely that it is
shared with many animals, too. However,
since human beings have developed more
complex behaviors and processes with
respect to those managed by other ani-
mals, HPP must be shown to be flexible
enough to (1) manage high levels of infor-
mation (if it is the only mechanism), or
(2) collaborate with other mechanisms of
information processing. Clark is aware of
this possible limitation, as he posed it in
terms of open questions. The mechanism
of predictive processing could be suffi-
ciently powerful to be successfully applied
to higher processing, as suggested by Cisek
and Kalaska (2010, p. 276) too, but large-
scale non-hierarchical mechanisms (able
to recursively manage several process-
ing systems) must also be hypothesized.
Evidence from neuroscience enlightened
that magnetic stimulation produces dif-
ferent effects, which are dependent on
initial conditions of the cell assembly
(Hoshi et al., 2000; Silvanto et al., 2008).
State-dependent cell assemblies provide
the cognitive system with flexibility that
is likely to account for high-level (long-
term) processes such as planning, PM, and
decision-making.
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